

GRID-FR CA

Certificate Policy And Certification Practice Statement

Document OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.20326.16140314.7180904.10.1.1

Status: Draft

Version 1.1

December 2017

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Document Revision History

| Version | Date | Comments |
|---------|--------------|----------------|
| 1.0 | Aug 01, 2017 | Initial Draft |
| | Oct 18, 2017 | Initial Review |
| 1.1 | Dec 20, 2017 | |
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| | | |

1. INTRODUCTION

1.1 Overview

RENATER is the National Research and Education Network (NREN) for France that provides broadband Internet and advanced research computing services to the higher education community in France.

RENATER – hereafter called GRID-FR Service – provides a differentiated set of offers for identity certification for science and research for the purpose of cross-organizational distributed resources access, solely in the context of academic and research and similar, not-commercially competitive, applications. These services are primarily intended for the practitioners of scientific research in France, appropriately taking into account the European and global nature of research and collaboration.

This document is written in accordance with the specifications outlined by RFC3647.

This document contains the combined Certificate Policy (CP) and Certificate Practice Statement (CPS) of the GRID-FR CA stating the applicable rules and procedures for the GRID-FR Certification Authority. GRID-FR CA is an offline CA and operates in accordance with EUGridPMA guidelines.

GRID-FR CA operates a set of PKI X.509 certification authorities (CAs), it is a self-signed Root CA that only certifies subordinate CAs which are dedicated to FRANCE-GRILLES activities in the context of GRID and/or CLOUD operations.

1.2 Document name and identification

Document title: GRID-FR CA Certification Policy and Certification Practice Statement Version: 1.0 Date: July 2017 Object Identifier of Document: 1.3.6.1.4.1.20326.16140314.7180904.10.1.0 Where: IANA 1.3.6.1.4.1 **Education Nationale** 20326 16140314 PKI CP/CPS 7180904 CA 10 Major version 1 Minor version 1

1.3 PKI participants

1.3.1 Certification authorities

GRID-FR CA is an offline Certification Authority, it is a self-signed root CA which ONLY issues CA certificates to the following subordinates CAs: GRID-FR Personnels CA, GRID-FR Services CA, and GRID-FR Robots CA.

These subordinates CAs issue in turn personal, server/service, or robot end-entity certificates for French entities, which are involved in activities of FRANCE-GRILLES.

The root GRID-FR CA and its subordinate CAs are hosted by the MEN¹ PKI and operated by RENATER (http://www.renater.fr).

1.3.2 Registration authorities

The GRID-FR CA is directly operated by the RENATER CMG, who also take the role of registration authority.

RENATER CMG alone is responsible for all approvals and revocations.

1.3.3 End Entities

GRID-FR CA shall issue certificates only to the following subordinate CAs dedicated to activities of France-GRILLES: GRID-FR Personnels CA, GRID-FR Services CA, and GRID-FR Robots CA.

1.3.4 Relying Parties

No stipulation

1.3.5 Other participants

No stipulation

1.4 Certificate usage

1.4.1. Appropriate Certificate Usage

Certificates issued by the GRID-FR CA are intended to be used in compliance with this CP/CPS.

The authorized uses of certificates issued by GRID-FR CA are:

- To validate the signature of its subordinate CA, and generally to validate any certificate issued by one of its subordinate CA if and only if the certificates are being used for their permitted purposes.
- To validate the signature of CRL issued by itself.

The certificates issued by the GRID-FR CA are not appropriate for any use other than for the certification of its subordinate CAs, which are dedicated to FRANCE-GRILLES activities in the context of GRID and/or CLOUD operations.

1.4.2 Prohibited certificate uses

The GRID-FR CA certificates shall not be used for financial transactions or any other use or purpose contrary the French or International law.

All uses out of the scope described into the section 1.4.1 are prohibited. This means that GRID-FR CA in no way cannot be held responsible for any prohibited use.

1.5 Policy administration

1.5.1 Organization administering the document

This document is administered by the GRID-FR PMA, which is managed by RENATER and hosted by MEN PKI.

The Organization contact details are:

GIP RENATER 23-25 Rue Daviel – 75013 Paris – Tel.: +33 1 53 94 20 30

¹ French National Education Minister

Email: grid-fr@renater.fr

Operation of the GRID-FR CA is effected by: GIP RENATER Université Grenoble Alpes DGDSI 41 rue des Mathématiques 38400 Saint Martin d'Heres Email: grid-fr@renater.fr Web: http://grid-fr.renater.fr

The Policy Management Authority (PMA) of the GRID-FR Service shall be RENATER.

1.5.2 Contact person

The responsible Managers of the GRID-FR Service are: Claude Gross, <u>claude.gross@renater.fr</u>, postal address as above

The following persons are the contacts for any remark or question about GRID-FR CA: Mirvat Aljogami, mirvat.aljogami@renater.fr Claude Gross, claude.gross@renater.fr Marc Turpin, marc.turpin@renater.fr

1.5.3 Person determining CPS suitability for the policy

The persons, mentioned in section 1.5.2, are responsible for this policy and works with the EUGridPMA for the review and approval of this CP/CPS. Changes or updates are made in accordance with the French law.

1.5.4 CPS approval procedures

Changes to the Policy and the Practice Statements are approved by the GRID-FR Service Manager, having consulted with relevant accreditation bodies and representative stakeholder bodies.

The review and approval process must assure that this CP/CPS adheres to RFC 3647.

1.5.5 Modifications of the CP/CPS

Modification of this CP/CPS may be effected at any time in accordance with the procedures specified in section 1.5.4.

1.6 Definitions and acronyms

Conventional PKI definitions apply. The following terms are specific to this document:

| GRID-FR | The French National Grid Initiative |
|---------------------------|---|
| GRID-FR Service | The ensemble of services and CAs offered by the GRID-FR |
| GRID-FR Managers | The individual(s) responsible for the coordination of the GRID-FR policy, its interpretation, adoption, evolution, accreditation, and verification. |
| GRID-FR Administrators | The individuals responsible for the technical development and implementation of the GRID-FR Service and for ensuring its continued |

| | compliance with the Policy and documented Practices |
|-------------------|---|
| GRID-FR Operators | The individuals that can issue certificate and publish updated revocation information for the specific GRID-FR CA for which they have been granted an operational privilege. For the GRID-FR CA, the only GRID-FR Operators shall be the MEN PKI Administrators, which host the PKI. |
| GRID-FR Root CA | The self-signed offline root certification authority of the GRID-FR |
| MEN | "Ministère de l'Education Nationale" (MEN) is the French Ministry of National Education, Higher Education and Research. |
| MEN PKI CMG | MEN PKI CA Manager Group This committee is responsible for the management of the MEN PKI. Agents of MEN compose it. |
| FRANCE GRILLES | France Grilles is a scientific group of interest gathering 8 major research organizations set up in agreement with the European Commission to constitute the French National Grid Initiative. France Grilles is mandated to act on behalf of France within the European Grid Infrastructure boards. France Grilles is operated by the CNRS laboratory named "Institut des Grilles et du Cloud" and oversees the deployment of production grids and clouds at the national level in France. |
| RENATER | RENATER, French National Research and Education Network, federate telecommunication infrastructures for Research and Education. |
| RENATER CMG | RENATER CA Manager Group This committee is responsible for the management of the GRID- FR CA and its subordinates CAs (GRID-FR Personnels CA, GRID-FR Services CA, and GRID-FR Robots CA). Agents of RENATER compose it. |
| CRL | This is the Certificate Revocation List. This list collect all the certificate declared as "invalid certificates". This list is signed and issued by the CA at regular intervals, and is used to validate or invalidate a certificate. |
| IANA | Internet Assigned Numbers Authority |
| РКІ | Public Key Infrastructure |
| HSM | Hardware Security Module |

2 PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1 Repositories

GRID-FR CA shall publish its certificates, CRLs and this CP/CPS at the online repository, which is accessible at the URL http://grid-fr.renater.fr/

The documents shall be electronically signed to ensure the authenticity, and the integrity.

2.2 Publication of CA information

The GRID-FR CA shall make the following publicly available on the online repository:

- The GRID-FR CA's PEM, DER, CER and text format of CA certificate.
- The PEM-formatted and DER-formatted CRL.
- A copy of this CP/CPS document and the previous versions.

2.3 Time or frequency of publication

CRL will be updated immediately after revocation is issued.

GRID-FR CA CRL are issued as soon as a certificate is revoked and at least once a day for a validity time of one year.

CP/CPS should be verified every 2 years. Once approved, changes to this document will be published.

Previous versions will remain available online.

2.4 Access controls on repositories

GRID-FR CA imposes no access control restrictions to the published information including policy, certificate, issued certificates and CRL. Excluding reasonable scheduled maintenance and unforeseen failures, the online repository will be available 24/7 basis. Only RENATER CMG can access to add, modify or remove any online repository information.

3 IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION

3.1 Naming

3.1.1 Types of names

The GRID-FR CA assigns subject name in its issued certificates as non-empty X.501 Distinguished Names (DNs). Each assigned subject name identifies a single entity and shall never be re-assigned to any other entity.

The issuerName in the issued certificates shall be set to the name of the GRID-FR CA, which is represented as a non-empty X.501 DN.

For the GRID-FR CA the Issuer Distinguished Name is:

/C=FR/O=MENESR/OU=GRID-FR/CN=AC GRID-FR

For the issued certificates the DN starts with "C=FR, O=MENESR, OU=GRID-FR", and ends with the field "CN". The CN is composed by the string "AC GRID-FR" and followed by a string related to the type of the certificate issued by the CA as follow:

- CN = AC GRID-FR Personnels for the subordinate GRID-FR Personnels CA
- CN = AC GRID-FR Services for the subordinate GRID-FR Services CA

- CN = AC GRID-FR Robots for the subordinate GRID-FR Robots CA.

The Organization (O) attribute value is obtained from the name of the MEN Root CA, the Organization Unit (OU) attribute value is obtained from the name of the GRID-FR CA (issuer CA), and the Common Name (CN) attribute value is obtained directly from the name of the subordinate CA to which the certificate is issued.

3.1.2 Need for names to be meaningful

The Subject Name will represent the subordinate CA in a clear manner. It shall name its subordinate CA in the subject name in a way that – at the time of initial issuance – will clarify the purpose, scope, constituency, target audience, or technical model of the subordinate CA. See section 3.1.1

3.1.3 Anonymity or Pseudonymity of subscribers

GRID-FR CA will neither issue nor sign pseudonymous or anonymous certificates.

3.1.4 Rules for interpreting various name forms

Names should be in ASCII encoding and should contain only alphanumeric and the dot and underscore characters in accordance with section 3.1.1 and 3.1.2

3.1.5 Uniqueness of names

The subject name in a certificate must be unambiguous, unique for each certificate issued by the GRID-FR CA, assigned to only one entity and never assigned to any other entity.

3.1.6 Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks

No stipulation.

3.2 Initial identity validation

3.2.1 Method to prove possession of private key

The proof of possession of the private key by the AC is performed by the key pair generation process. See section 6.1.1.

3.2.2 Authentication of organization identity

GRID-FR CA shall issue certificates only to the following subordinate CAs: GRID-FR Personnels CA, GRID-FR Services CA, and GRID-FR Robots CA. All these CAs are operated by RENATER.

3.2.3 Authentication of individual identity

Subordinate CAs signed by the GRID-FR CA are operated by members of the RENATER CMG.

In the contexte of validating subordinate CAs, the authentication of idividuals as private keys activation data holders and trusted roles is done by the validation of their names, which is based on the presentation of an official ID (national identity card, passport, ...) during the in-person key ceremonies.

3.2.4 Non-verified subscriber information

No stipulation.

3.2.5 Validation of authority

See section 3.2.2 & 3.2.3 RENATER is authoritative for GRID-FR CA and for its subordinate CA entities.

3.2.6 Criteria for interoperation

No stipulation.

3.3 Identification and authentication of re-key requests

The MEN PKI supports no re-keying. When a valid certificate is about to expire, RENATER CMG can ask for renew it, and follow the same procedure than an initial certificate request. So, a new private key is generated.

3.3.1 Identification and authentication for routine re-key

No re-key is available. Routine re-key shall be accomplished using the same procedures as for initial registration.

3.3.2 Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation

There is no re-keying available. Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation shall be accomplished using the same procedures as for initial registration.

3.4 Identification and authentication for revocation request

A revocation must be requested as soon as needed. The persons eligible to request a revocation are:

- A member of RENATER CMG or MEN PKI CMG
- RA manager of each GRID-FR subordinate CAs
- Every people who suspect that the private key of GRID-FR CA or GRID-FR subordinate CAs is compromised or suspected to be compromised.

4. CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

The CP/CPS of every subordinated issuing CA defines in detail Subscriber Certificate application.

4.1 Certificate Application

4.1.1 Who can submit a certificate application

An application for a certificate must be submitted by a member of the RENATER CMG only for subordinates CA, dedicated to FRANCE-GRILLES activities.

4.1.2 Enrolment process and responsibilities

No stipulation.

4.2 Certificate application processing

Requesters have to prove their identity according the documents as specified by the relevant issuing CA as described in section 3.2.3.

4.2.1 Performing identification and authentication functions

RENATER CMG verifies according to the procedure described in the sections 3.2.3 and 1.3.3 the eligible and the consistence of the request.

4.2.2 Approval or rejection of certificate applications

If submitting certificate requirements described in the section 4.1.1, and certificate techniques requirements are fulfilled, the certificate request is approved; else the certificate request is rejected.

4.2.3 Time to process certificate applications

The process is performed in the best effort.

4.3 Certificate issuance

4.3.1 CA actions during certificate issuance

RENATER CMG makes sure to issue a correct CA certificate according to this CP/CPS. Only a single member of RENATER CMG can issue CA certificate after a successful control, with the presence of members of MEN PKI CMG and neutral witnesses, and the action is recorded. He verifies the content of the naming document of the subordinate CA, in terms of completeness and accuracy of the information present. This document is used as the basis for the key ceremony realization and the CA key pair generation described in the section 6.1.

4.3.2 Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of certificate

As the subscriber is a subordinate CA, the key pair is generated during the key ceremony by a single designated member of RENATER CMG which is the requester. So the requester is notified in person directly at the end of the key ceremony.

4.4 Certificate acceptance

4.4.1 Conduct constituting certificate acceptance

No stipulation.

4.4.2 Publication of the certificate by the CA

GRID-FR CA will publish all information on its public repository, which provides access to:

- The certificates of the GRID-FR CA and its subordinates CA
- The CRLs of the GRID-FR CA and its subordinates CA
- All past and current versions of the CP/CPS of GRID-FR CA and its subordinates CA
- The certificates issued by the CA and their status
- Information about the RA

GRID-FR CA will publish as soon as issued the CRLs and the certificates issued on its repository.

4.4.3 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities No stipulation.

4.5 Key pair and certificate usage

4.5.1 Subscriber private key and certificate usage

The subscriber (subordinate CA) private key and certificate usage shall be guided by the respective CAs CP/CPS. The authorized uses are described in the section 1.4.1 & 6.1.7.

4.5.2 Relying party public key and certificate usage

The subscriber (subordinate CA) public key and certificate usage by relying parties is described in the section 1.4, and it shall be specified by the respective CP/CPS.

4.6 Certificate renewal

4.6.1 Circumstance for certificate renewal GRID-FR CA does not support certificate renewal.

4.6.2 Who may request renewal Not applicable

4.6.3 Processing certificate renewal requests Not applicable

4.6.4 Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber Not applicable

4.6.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate Not applicable

4.6.6 Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA Not applicable

4.6.7 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities Not applicable

4.7 Certificate re-key

4.7.1 Circumstance for certificate re-key

Certificate re-key request for a subject CA can only be submitted by a member of RENATER CMG who is an authorized and authenticated representative of the subordinate CAs. The Re-keying follow the same procedure as an initial certificate request.

4.7.2 Who may request certification of a new public key The same requirements described in the section 4.1.1.

4.7.3 Processing certificate re-keying requests

Re-keying requests shall be processed following the same procedures as for a new certificate issuance.

4.7.4 Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber See section 4.3.2.

4.7.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate See section 4.3.1.

4.7.6 Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA See section 4.4.2.

4.7.7 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities No stipulation.

4.8 Certificate modification

4.8.1 Circumstance for certificate modification

GRID-FR CA does not support certificate modification. A subscriber requests a new certificate instead.

4.8.2 Who may request certificate modification No Stipulation.

4.8.3 Processing certificate modification requests No Stipulation.

4.8.4 Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber No Stipulation.

4.8.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate No Stipulation.

4.8.6 Publication of the modified certificate by the CA No Stipulation.

4.8.7 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities No Stipulation.

4.9 Certificate revocation and suspension

4.9.1 Circumstances for revocation

A certificate must be revoked as soon as possible in the following circumstances:

- The subject CA does not apply the obligations binding by virtue of this policy.
- The certificate is not required any more by the subject CA.
- The private key is lost, compromised or suspected to be compromised.
- The information in the certificate is modified, wrong or inaccurate.
- The entity to which the certificate has been issued has been retired or no longer existed.
- The subscriber (subordinate CA) doesn't comply with this policy.
- The subordinate CA doesn't function in compliance of its own policy.
- The subordinate CA changes its policy without approval of RENATER CMG.

4.9.2 Who can request revocation

A member of the RENATER CMG, a member of the MEN PKI CMG or any entity who suspects the occurrence of any of the circumstances for revocation listed in section 4.9.1 are available to request revocation.

4.9.3 Procedure for revocation request

The entity requesting revocation of a certificate shall submit their revocation request to the RENATER CMG using the contacts in section 1.5.2.

Upon receipt of a revocation request, the GRID-FR CA shall :

- 1. Verify the circumstances for revocation
- 2. Verify the identity of the revocation requester in accordance with the section 4.9.2

If all the conditions are met, RENATER CMG shall then revoke the certificate.

4.9.4 Revocation request grace period

There is no grace period in the case of revocation, if the circumstances for revocation are identifying, the revocation request is approved as soon as possible but not later than within one business day.

4.9.5 Time within which CA must process the revocation request

Once the revocation is approved, the certificate is immediately revoked and the CRL is renewed, and published.

4.9.6 Revocation checking requirement for relying parties

Relying parties must download the CRL from the online repository at least once a day and implement its restrictions while validating certificates.

4.9.7 CRL issuance frequency

The CRL of the GRID-FR CA is valid one year with a one-month overlap.

4.9.8 Maximum latency for CRLs

The maximum latency to publish CRL following its generation is 30 minutes.

4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking availability

No stipulations

4.9.10 On-line revocation checking requirements No stipulation.

4.9.11 Other forms of revocation advertisements available No stipulation.

4.9.12 Special requirements re-key compromise No stipulation.

4.9.13 Circumstances for suspension GRID-FR CA does not suspend any certificate.

4.9.14 Who can request suspension

GRID-FR CA does not suspend any certificate.

4.9.15 Procedure for suspension request GRID-FR CA does not suspend any certificate.

4.9.16 Limits on suspension period GRID-FR CA does not suspend any certificate.

4.10 Certificate status services

4.10.1 Operational characteristics

GRID-FR CA shall publish its full and complete CRL at the online repository.

4.10.2 Service availability

The online repository is maintained on best effort basis with intended availability of 24x7.

4.10.3 Optional features

No stipulation.

4.11 End of subscription

The subscription ends if the certificate is not re-keyed or re-newed before its expiry date or once the subordinate CA has been revoked.

4.12 Key escrow and recovery

4.12.1 Key escrow and recovery policy and practices

GRID-FR CA shall not provide key escrow or recovery service.

4.12.2 Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices Not applicable.

5. FACILITY, MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS

Stipulations in this section are applicable to this CA. For subordinate CAs, refer to the corresponding CA.

5.1 Physical controls

5.1.1 Site location and construction

The machine hosting the GRID-FR CA shall be located in a closed, secure and safe location.

5.1.2 Physical access

Physical access to the sensitive functions of the infrastructure is strictly limited to the authorized nominated staff only.

Physical access to the components supporting these functions is limited to persons authorized by the establishment of a physical security perimeter, allowing the roles separation between the various parties involved.

Access traceability is ensured, physical intrusion detection measures are implemented, particularly via the use of cameras, and physical security measures are also in place to limit access to sensitive materials.

5.1.3 Power and air conditioning

Electricity supply and air conditioning systems are implemented in order to ensure services availability. The materials used to carry out the services are operated according to conditions defined by their suppliers.

5.1.4 Water exposures

Adequate alarming is ensured. The datacenter is located in an area that has no special exposures, and the systems installations have no exposure to flooding or other liquid flows.

5.1.5 Fire prevention and protection

The datacenter is equipped with fire safety system and fire control system.

5.1.6 Media storage

All media containing the private key or copies of private key of the CA are kept in the locked safe. All other media related to the CA including the CA offline machine are kept in a safe and locked cabinet. The all are stored in a secured place.

5.1.7 Waste disposal

Waste carrying potential confidential information is physically destroyed before being trashed.

5.1.8 Off-site backup

The system generates periodically a backup of all digital information (data, code, configuration, etc.). The backup contains all information relevant for the CA service in encrypted form.

This process guarantees that the off-site storage of all data from the PKI environment is fully encrypted.

Off-site backup insure a quick PKI services recovery following a disaster or a serious event.

5.2 Procedural controls

5.2.1 Trusted roles

All persons with access to the systems hosting the GRID-FR CA will be employees of MEN who are members of the MEN PKI CMG.

Administrators of the system have a total control of the hardware, operating system, and software management. Cryptographic information, like the private key of the CA, or the CA itself, is under control of restricted personnel of MEN PKI CMG and RENTAER CMG. All roles related to the CA operations are performed by CA Administrators who are members of RENATER CMG

5.2.2 Number of persons required per task

Multiple roles can be assigned to the same person, if this holding does not compromise the security of the functions implemented.

All the MEN PKI software is managed and supported (including role-driven) by:

- Access to the machines: 3 employees for network access configuration and CA maintenance and management tasks
- Operations: 2 persons for system administration, CA operation

5.2.3 Identification and authentication for each role

In the MEN PKI CA software, identification and authentication for all roles are performed using secure access control materials (certificates, accounts, etc.) that identify these roles and their corresponding rights.

5.2.4 Roles requiring separation of duties

No stipulation.

5.3 Personnel controls

5.3.1 Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements

Only persons who are technically and professionally qualified are granted to access.

Each person involved in the CA infrastructure and PKI process is informed of its responsibilities regarding PKI services and processes related to system security and personnel control.

5.3.2 Background check procedures

Employees of the MEN manage MEN PKI. Background of each employee must not contain any criminal record.

The background of each additional RENATER CMG administrator is also assessed.

5.3.3 Training requirements

No stipulation.

5.3.4 Retraining frequency and requirements

No stipulation.

5.3.5 Job rotation frequency and sequence No stipulation.

5.3.6 Sanctions for unauthorized actions

If an unauthorized action is observed, the CA manager may revoke the privileges concerned.

5.3.7 Independent contractor requirements

Contractors who require any access to the CA, operations, or who want to integrate RENATER CMG must proof their qualification. If not, contractors must follow the training.

5.3.8 Documentation supplied to personnel

No stipulation.

5.4 Audit logging procedures

5.4.1 Types of events recorded

The following events are audited:

- Certificate requests
- Rejected certificate requests
- Certificate signing
- Certificate issues
- Certificate revocation
- CRL issues
- Boots, shut-downs and reboots of the offline CA machines
- E-mails sent and received by MEN-PKI software

5.4.2 Frequency of processing log

Logs are processed persistently, and archived every month.

5.4.3 Retention period for audit log Logs are kept as long as possible.

5.4.4 Protection of audit log

Different accesses are granted depending of the role:

- Full access to the GRID-FR Operators (PKI administrators)
- Privileged access for GRID-FR Service manager is also granted.

5.4.5 Audit log backup procedures

The audit log is back up every night on an offline secure medium.

5.4.6 Audit collection system (internal vs. external)

The audit log collection system is an internal MEN system.

5.4.7 Notification to event-causing subject

No stipulation.

5.4.8 Vulnerability assessments

All the MEN PKI (meaning this CA) is monitored all the time (24x7).

5.5 Records archival

5.5.1 Types of records archived

The following events are audited:

- All certificate application data including certification and revocation
- All certificates and CRLs or certificate status records generated
- The login/logout/reboot of the issuing machine.
- The logs for all PKI component entities.

5.5.2 Retention period for archive

The CA certificate (public key) and all issued certificates will be kept for a period of 5 years after their expiry

The logs treated in section 5.4 are archived for a period of 7 years after their generation. All other data listed in section 5.5.1 are archived at least 10 years.

5.5.3 Protection of archive

Appropriate measures are in place to protect data from manipulation and deletion. During all the times of their preservation, archives and backups are totally protected, accessible only to authorized persons, and its can be consulted and exploited. Different accesses are granted depending of the role:

- Full access to the GRID-FR Operators (PKI administrators)
- Privileged access for GRID-FR Service manager authenticated by his certificates and access controlled by IP address

5.5.4 Archive backup procedures

The archives are backed up every night on an offline secure medium.

5.5.5 Requirements for time-stamping of records

The online machines are synchronized to a NTP stratum 2 time server. The offline machine is manually synchronized.

5.5.6 Archive collection system (internal or external)

The audit log collection system is an internal MEN system. See section 5.5.3

5.5.7 Procedures to obtain and verify archive information

Archive information can be requested to the MEN PKI CMG members. The contacted member provides information to the requester.

5.6 Key changeover

GRID-FR CA's private signing key is changed periodically. The overlap between the old key and the new one is for at least one year. From that time on, the newly generated signing key signs any new certificates. During that period, the old CA certificate must be valid to verify all certification chain of old and valid end entity certificates signed by its private key and also to sign CRL, until expiry of all certificates signed by it.

5.7 Compromise and disaster recovery

5.7.1 Incident and compromise handling procedures

In the event of an incident, which compromises the integrity of the GRID-FR CA, the CA personnel shall initiate an incident analysis immediately. Further steps to be undertaken will depend on the outcome of the analysis. If private key is damaged, see section 5.7.3.

5.7.2 Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted

The CA will take best effort precautions to enable recovery.

In order to be able to resume operation as fast as possible after the compute basis of the CA is corrupted, the following steps shall be performed:

- 1. All CA software shall be backed-up on a dedicated removable media after a new release of any of its components is installed.
- 2. All data files of the CA signing server shall be backed-up on a dedicated removable medium after each change, before the session is closed.

If any part of the running system is corrupted, a functioning hardware shall be loaded with the latest state of the software and data backed-up on a read-only medium and estimated to be uncorrupted. If not all encrypted copies of the GRID-FR CA private key are destroyed or lost, and are not compromised, the operation shall be re-established as soon as possible without need to revoke all issued certificates.

The GRID-FR CA and its sub–CAs are backed-up every night.

5.7.3 Entity private key compromise procedures

In the event of private key compromise GRID-FR CA shall immediately revoke the corresponding certificate and stop accepting certificate applications. Subscribers will also be informed of this incident. Circumstances that led to the compromise will then be fixed and eliminated. A new key and certificate for the CA will then be re-created and operations restarted with a new certificate.

5.7.4 Business continuity capabilities after a disaster

After a disaster, MEN PKI CMG shall take the appropriate decision to establish a new PKI service, recover its systems from backup and restart operations in a best effort.

5.8 CA or RA termination

Upon permanent termination of GRID-FR CA, the CA will:

- 1. Inform the EUGridPMA, France Grilles, and all affected entities.
- 2. Inform all subscribers, all relying parties, and RAs.
- 3. Announce termination on GRID-FR's website.

- 4. Terminate the issuance and distribution of certificates and CRLs.
- 5. Archive all relevant information in accordance with section 5.5
- 6. Revoke all certificates.
- 7. Notify relevant security contacts.
- 8. Destroy all copies of private keys.
- 9. Notify as widely as possible the end of the service.
- 10. Notify the relevant security contact.

6. TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS

6.1 Key pair generation and installation

6.1.1 Key pair generation

The GRID-FR CA and its subscribers (subordinate CAs) key pairs are generated during the key ceremonies attended by the representatives of RENATER CMG and MEN PKI CMG with the presence of neutral witnesses.

The key pairs generation is performed using an offline machine, on an offline dedicated system (HSM media), which is stored encrypted in a safe facility location in accordance with section 5.1.

The key ceremonies take place under the control of three people. Following their generation, the secret shares (activation data) are handed over to those holders designated in advance for this trusting role. Secrecy shares of at least two of these three persons form the pass phrase, which is required for access to private keys.

6.1.2 Private key delivery to subscriber

GRID-FR CA does not generate private keys and therefore does not deliver private keys since they are directly generated on an offline dedicated system (HSM media) that the subscriber accesses. See section 6.1.1

6.1.3 Public key delivery to certificate issuer

The subscriber's public key is delivered to the CA in the form of a PKCS#10 request during a key ceremony. See section 6.1.1

6.1.4 CA public key delivery to relying parties

GRID-FR CA public keys can be downloaded from the online repository.

6.1.5 Key sizes

The signing keys of GRID-FR CA used RSA encryption algorithm and a SHA-256 hashing mechanism, and the key size is at least 3072 bits.

6.1.6 Public key parameters generation and quality checking

GRID-FR CA will refuse to certify public keys not matching its quality requirements. The key pairs are generated only on HSM system evaluated certified EAL 4+ and qualified reinforced.

6.1.7 Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)

GRID-FR CA keys may be used for certificate signing and for CRL signing. Subscriber (subordinate CA) keys may be used for certificate signing and for CRL signing.

6.1.8 Hardware/software key generation

Reasonable steps are taked to ensure that the key pair is generated with an reputable algorithms and with a sufficiently high entropy.

The GRID-FR CA and its subordinate CAs key pairs are generated on an offline HSM media using a recent and trustworthy version of the OpenSSL software package.

6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls

6.2.1 Cryptographic module standards and controls

The GRID-FR CA is an offline CA that does not use a separate cryptographic module. Key material is stored on a secure offline media in an encrypted form, under conditions described in sections 5.1.6, 5.1.8, and 6.1.1. The key shall never be stored in an unencrypted form. This media shall never be connected to a machine that is or has been connected to a network.

6.2.2 Private key (n out of m) multi-person control

The passphrase to access the private keys is known by three people belong to RENTAER CMG and MEN PKI CMG, who are the activation data holders. See section 6.1.1

6.2.3 Private key escrow

The GRID-FR CA does not escrow any keys.

6.2.4 Private key backup

The GRID-FR CA private key is kept, in files in an encrypted form (AES or 3DES), on multiple secure offline media stored in different secure locations. The passphrase to access the private key is known by three persons as per section 6.2.2.

The subscriber (subordinate CAs) private keys are kept on the same way.

6.2.5 Private key archival

The GRID-FR CA private key is never archived beyond its active use or post the termination of the CA. It is only backed up during its validity period as per section 6.2.4.

6.2.6 Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module

The GRID-FR CA does not employ a separate cryptographic module. Key material is stored as described in section 6.2.1.

6.2.7 Private key storage on cryptographic module

The GRID-FR CA does not employ a separate cryptographic module. Key material is stored as described in section 6.2.1.

6.2.8 Method of activating private key

The GRID-FR CA private key is activated on an offline dedicated media by providing a pass phrase of at least 15 characters, with the presence of at least two of three persons in the activation data holder trust roles.

The subscriber (subordinate CAs) private keys are activated on the same way.

6.2.9 Method of deactivating private key

The private key is de-activated by removing the pass phrase from memory in the offline machine and powering down the offline system memory for at least 10 seconds.

6.2.10 Method of destroying private key

Following termination of CA operations, all copies of the private key will be securely destroyed according to the current best practice for the destruction of sensitive materials.

6.2.11 Cryptographic Module Rating

Not applicable: the GRID-FR CA does not employ a separate cryptographic module.

6.3 Other aspects of key pair management

6.3.1 Public key archival

The GRID-FR CA archives all issued certificates including the GRID-FR CA self-signed certificate on the offline system as well as on a dedicated storage media kept in a secure place. The GRID-FR CA public key and the public keys of subscribers are also published in the online repository, and periodically backed-up to off-site locations as per section 5.1.8.

The CA certificate and all issued certificates are archived 5 years after their expiry as per section 5.5.2.

6.3.2 Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods

The GRID-FR CA's certificate shall have a validity period of no longer than 24 years. The certificates issued by the GRID-FR CA shall have a validity period of no longer than 24 years, and for no longer than the issuing GRID-FR CA certificate itself is valid.

6.4 Activation data

6.4.1 Activation data generation and installation

During the GRID-FR CA key pair generation, the activation data is generated on the same offline secure system (HSM) used to perform the CA key pair generation. The CA private key then is protected by providing a pass phrase of at least 15 characters, which is known by three authorized persons in the activation data holder trust roles. See section 6.1.1

The CA private key is activated by providing a pass phrase, with the presence of at least two of these three persons in the activation data holder trust roles.

For the subscribers (subordinate CAs), the generation and installation of the activation data is performed on the same way.

6.4.2 Activation data protection

The activation data are protected from disclosure by a combination of cryptographic mechanisms and physical access control.

All private keys are protected by a pass phrase known by the authorized staff persons, so it is up to them to protect this pass phrase. At least two of these three persons are required to access the private key. A modification into the staff implies the pass phrase to be changed.

6.4.3 Other aspects of activation data No stipulation.

6.5 Computer security controls

6.5.1 Specific computer security technical requirements

The offline system is maintained at a high level of security by applying all patches relevant to an offline system. It is kept within a controlled area and never connected to any network, either during installations, configuration, or operation. Patches are transferred using external media.

The online repository system environment, as well as any hosting platform on which the online repository system is running, is maintained at a high-level of security by timely application of all relevant patches. Access is restricted to a few stations protected behind a firewall.

Furthermore:

- Any software change is monitored and dealt with by the MEN Administrators.
- System and service configuration is reduced to the bare minimum needed to provide the service in the necessary quality and availability

6.5.2 Computer security rating

The GRID-FR CA PKI system designed according the recommendations of the CEN CWA 14167-1 document: "Security requirement for managing digital certificates trustworthy system for electronic signatures."

6.6 Life cycle technical controls

6.6.1 System development controls No stipulation.

6.6.2 Security management controls No stipulation.

6.6.3 Life cycle security controls No stipulation.

6.7 Network security controls

The GRID-FR CA offline system does not have a network.

6.8 Time-stamping

Time stamping of certificates will be done based on the internal system clock, which is synchronized as described in section 5.5.5.

7. CERTIFICATE, CRL, AND OCSP PROFILES

7.1 Certificate profile

7.1.1 Version number(s) All certificates shall be formatted as X.509 version 3 certificates.

7.1.2 Certificate extensions

The CA certificate of the GRID-FR CA shall have the following extensions:Basic ConstraintsCritical, CA:TrueKey UsageCritical, Certificate Sign, CRL Sign

Subject Key Identifier keyid:*identifier*

The certificates issued to subscribers (subordinate CAs) shall have the following extensions:

| Basic Constraints | Critical, CA:True |
|--------------------------------|--|
| Key Usage | Critical, Certificate Sign, CRL Sign |
| Subject Key Identifier | The keyID identifier of the subscribers public key |
| Authority Key Identifier | keyid: <i>identifier</i> |
| CRL Distribution Points | Full Name URI: http://crl.grid-fr.pncn.education.gouv.fr/ac- |
| grid-fr.crl | |

where the *identifier* shall be composed of the 160-bit SHA-1 hash of the value of the BIT STRING containing the pertinent public key (excluding the tag, length, and number of unused bits) as per option 1 of section 4.2.1.2 of RFC 5280.

7.1.3 Algorithm object identifiers

The appropriate object identifiers shall be included in the certificates.

For GRID-FR CA, the algorithm identifier shall be sha256WithRSAEncryption (1.2.840.113549.1.1.11).

7.1.4 Name forms

The subject and issuer names of the GRID-FR CA certificate shall be the ordered sequence of sets of size one, comprising

| Country (C) | FR |
|-------------------------|------------|
| Organization (0) | MENESR |
| OrganizationalUnit (OU) | GRID-FR |
| commonName (CN) | AC GRID-FR |

The subject name of subscribers shall be one of the following sequences of sets of size one:

| Country (C) | FR |
|-------------------------|---|
| Organization (0) | MENESR |
| OrganizationalUnit (OU) | GRID-FR |
| commonName (CN) | name of the subordinate CA as per section 3.1.1 |

and where the list of permissible subscriber subjectNames may in the future be extended by amending this CP/CPS according to the provisions of section 1.5.

7.1.5 Name constraints See section 3.1.2

7.1.6 Certificate policy object identifier

Issued certificates may contain the object identifier of the GRID-FR CA policy under which they are issued.

7.1.7 Usage of Policy Constraints extension No stipulation.

7.1.8 Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics No stipulation.

7.1.9 Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies extension No stipulation.

7.2 CRL profile

7.2.1 Version number(s)

Version number of the GRID-FR CA CRL is X.509 v2 compliant with RFC5280.

7.2.2 CRL and CRL entry extensions

No stipulation.

7.3 OCSP profile The GRID-FR CA does not operate an authoritative OCSP service.

7.3.1 Version number(s) Not applicable.

7.3.2 OCSP extensions

Not applicable.

8. COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS

8.1 Frequency or circumstances of assessment

The GRID-FR CA will ensure that all its procedures and processes are carried out in compliance with the provisions of this CP/CPS. To this end, it shall at least once a year perform a self-assessment to check the compliance of the operation with the CP/CPS document in effect, and effectuate a review of staff.

The GRID-FR CA accepts to be audited by qualified external peers, by bodies to which is has been accredited, and by qualified relying parties in order to verify its compliance with the rules and procedures prescribed herein. The requesting party must cover any costs associated with such audit.

8.2 Identity/qualifications of assessor

The auditor should be an expert in the domain of assessing public key infrastructures and familiar with the requirements of the CP/CPS. He should have the necessary knowledge to do this task correctly.

8.3 Assessor's relationship to assessed entity

Auditors should be independent of the RENATER CMG.

8.4 Topics covered by assessment

Auditors will conduct the compliance audits according to the present CP/CPS as well as the EUGridPMA recommendations.

8.5 Actions taken as a result of deficiency

Depending on nature, severity, and urgency of a deficiency, RENATER CMG may decide to temporarily suspend the CA services, revoke the certificate issued by the CA, or take any other action, which it considers appropriate.

All issues will be entered into the MEN PKI system either as incidents or as problems and tracked.

8.6 Communication of results

Report of the compliance audit shall be communicated to the RENATER CMG. Within 30 days of receiving the compliance audit results, RENATER CMG will prepare a statement regarding the open and present issues. If necessarily, a new CP/CPS will be produced

9. OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS

9.1 Fees

No fees shall be charged.

9.1.1 Certificate issuance or renewal fees No fees shall be charged.

9.1.2 Certificate access fees

No fees shall be charged for access to certificate.

9.1.3 Revocation or status information access fees

No fees shall be charged for access to certificate status information or CRLs.

9.1.4 Fees for other services No fees shall be charged.

9.1.5 Refund policy No fees shall be charged.

9.2 Financial responsibility

No financial responsibility is accepted.

9.2.1 Insurance coverage No financial responsibility is accepted.

9.2.2 Other assets

No financial responsibility is accepted.

9.2.3 Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities

No financial responsibility is accepted.

9.3 Confidentiality of business information

9.3.1 Scope of confidential information

The GRID-FR CA, in its validation of individual and organizational identity, will collect personal data about subscribers. This data collection is subject to the French Personal Data Protection Act (Loi Informatique et Libertés). The subscriber acknowledges that the stated data is being collected by the CA and permits storage of any such data in the secure repository intended in section 5 according to the stipulations made therein. Apart from the published certificates, certificate revocation lists, and the information on the online repository, the GRID-FR CA considers all data confidential.

9.3.2 Information not within the scope of confidential information

Information included in certificates and CRLs shall not be considered confidential.

9.3.3 Responsibility to protect confidential information

RENATER CMG shall not disclose confidential information unless so specified in this policy (to auditors and assessors), unless to its Managers, Administrators and Operators, and unless required by law or regulation.

9.4 Privacy of personal information

9.4.1 Privacy plan

GRID-FR CA maintains a minimum of personal data just to ensure that the same identity is not reassigned to a different entity and treats these data in accordance with French Law.

GRID-FR CA issues certificates to subordinate CAs that are regarded as organizations and organizational units. So it collects only information about its subscriber representatives such as full name, the communications identifiers (email addresses, telephone numbers, internet protocol addresses) and all other information that have been recorded to complete the validation as per section 3.2.3.

Data owners can request access to information regarding all their data at any time, and all reasonable requests to correct and/or amend the data will be processed promptly. Due to the nature of the service, it has a legitimate interest in recording the information recorded as per section 3.2.3 for as long as the certificate is valid plus the audit log retention period.

9.4.2 Information treated as private

Any information not explicitly made public is treated as private information. The RENATER CMG protects private information using appropriate safeguards and an appropriate degree of care

9.4.3 Information not deemed private

The following information collected by the GRID-FR CA is deemed not to be private:

- 1. Subscriber's organization email address
- 2. Subscriber's organization name
- 3. Subscriber's certificate

9.4.4 Responsibility to protect private information

RENATER CMG is responsible to protect private information from compromise and prevent from using it or disclosing it to third parties.

9.4.5 Notice and consent to use private information

RENATER CMG being the RAs, will only use private information if a subject person has given full consent in the course of the registration process. All collected information will be subject to the French law.

9.4.6 Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process

RENATER CMG may be forced to disclose confidential information to law enforcement agencies in France.

9.4.7 Other information disclosure circumstances

No stipulation.

9.5 Intellectual property rights

This document is formatted according to RFC [RFC3647] - S. Chokani, W. Ford, R. Sabett, C. Merrill, S. Wu (2003).

No intellectual property rights are claimed on issued certificates or certificate revocation lists.

Parts of this document have been copied from the CP/CPS documents of other EUGridPMA members mainly:

- 1. DutchGrid Root CP/CPS
- 2. KENET ROOT CA CP/CPS

9.6 Representations and warranties

9.6.1 CA representations and warranties

Except as stated in this CP/CPS or in a separate agreement with RENATER and the MEN, neither RENATER, nor any of the RENATER parties, nor the MEN, nor any MEN Managers, Administrators or Operators makes any representations regarding its services.

The GRID-FR CA represents to the extent specified in this CP/CPS that it:

- complies with this CP/CPS;
- the certificates issued by the GRID-FR CA will be issued solely in compliance with this CP/CPS;
- it will maintain an online accessible repository containing the published information with an intended continuous availability.

9.6.2 RA representations and warranties

The RENATER CMG, being the RAs, will act in accordance with the provisions in this CP/CPS.

9.6.3 Subscriber representations and warranties

Subscribers represent and warrant that certificates are only used for purposes compatible with section 1.4.

9.6.4 Relying party representations and warranties

Each relying party represents that, before relying on any certificate of the GRID-FR CA, it shall have read, understood, and act in compliance with this CP/CPS, that it has appropriate knowledge of PKI and appropriate technical implementations to validate certificates issued by the GRID-FR CA, and that it shall have obtained the up-to-date certificate status information as published by the GRID-FR CA and act in accordance therewith.

Each relying party shall represent that it bear the sole responsibility for reliance on any certificate issued by the GRID-FR CA, any such reliance is at its own risk, and that it has thereto executed an appropriate risk assessment.

Relying parties shall notify the RENATER CMG in case of security incidents within a delay of 1 day, and verify the CRL before validating a certificate.

9.6.5 Representations and warranties of other participants No stipulations.

9.7 Disclaimers of warranties

All certificates and any related materials, software, publications, and service are provided 'as-is' and 'as available', without any warranties. To the maximum extent

permitted by law, the GRID-FR Service, RENATER, RENATER partners, RENATER personnel, MEN, and all others involved in the GRID-FR Service disclaim all express and implies warranties and liabilities, including all warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, and non-infringement. Neither the GRID-FR Service, RENATER, RENATER partners, RENATER personnel, MEN, not any others involved in the GRID-FR Service warrant that any service, product, certificate or other artifact will meet any expectations or that access to certificates will be timely or error-free, or that it is available at any time. The GRID-FR CA may discontinue any service at any time following the provisions of section 5.8.

9.8 Limitations of liability

The GRID-FR Service, RENATER, RENATER partners, RENATER personnel, MEN, and all others involved in the GRID-FR Service decline any liability for damages incurred by any subscriber, relying party, or third party relying on the certificates or information issued or published by the GRID-FR CA or GRID-FR Service. It also declines any liability for damages arising from the non-issuance of a requested certificate, or for the revocation of a certificate initiated by the GRID-FR CA.

9.9 Indemnities

No fees shall be charged.

9.10 Term and termination

9.10.1 Term

This CP/CPS and any amendments are effective when published in the online repository as per the date there stated, and will remain in effect until replaced with a newer version or withdrawn.

9.10.2 Termination

This CP/CPS will remain in effect until replaced with a newer version or withdrawn.

9.10.3 Effect of termination and survival

All terms regarding confidentiality of personal and other data will continue to apply without restriction after termination. Also, the termination shall not affect any rights of action or remedy that may have accrued to any of the parties up to and including the date of termination.

9.11 Individual notices and communications with participants

Individuals can communicate with the GRID-FR CA using the information provided in section 2.2.

9.12 Amendments (?)

9.12.1 Procedure for amendment

This CP/CPS is reviewed annually at the time of the self-audit. Posting an updated version of the CP/CPS to the online repository makes amendments.

Corrections of spelling mistakes or typing errors, which do not alter the meaning of the CP/CPS, are authorized without notifications.

9.12.2 Notification mechanism and period

The RENATER CMG will post changes to this CP/CPS in its online repository. It will inform any bodies to which it has been accredited and that request prior notification for changes to the CP/CPS in a timely fashion in accordance with the provisions of section 1.1.5 before the new CP/CPS becomes effective.

9.12.3 Circumstances under which OID must be changed

The significant changes to the CP/CPS to be determined by the RENATER CMG will require the modification of the OID described in section 1.2 and affirmed in section 7.1.6.

9.13 Dispute resolution provisions

Legal disputes arising from the operation of the MEN PKI will be resolved according to the French Law.

9.14 Governing law

The interpretation, construction, and validity of this policy shall be governed by the laws of France.

9.15 Compliance with applicable law

This CP/CPS is subject to all applicable laws and regulations.

9.16 Miscellaneous provisions

9.16.1 Entire agreement

This CP/CPS constitutes the entire agreement between the RENATER CMG and the GRID-FR CA and any other party, unless a more specific agreement is in place. If such an agreement has provisions that differ from this CPS, the more specific agreement takes precedence, but only with respect to that party. No others may rely on such a more specific agreement, or bring action to enforce such agreement.

9.16.2 Assignment

Any entities operating under this CP/CPS may not re-assign their rights or obligations without consent of the RENATER CMG. RENATER CMG has the right to assign and delegate its operation under this CP/CPS to any entities of its choice.

9.16.3 Severability

The remainder of the CP/CPS provision remains valid and applicable even if there is a provision deemed invalid and not applicable.

9.16.4 Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights)

The requirements defined in the CP/CPS must be applied without any possible wavier of rights exemption.

9.16.5 Force Majeure

The GRID-FR CA cannot be held liable for any indirect damage and interruption of its services, which is caused by an occurrence beyond the RENATER CMG or MEN PKI CMG's reasonable control.

9.17 Other provisions

No stipulation.

10. Bibliography

[CERN Certification Authority Certificate Policy and Certification Practice Statement] version 2.3, November 8th 2004 http://service-grid-ca.web.cern.ch/service-grid-ca/cp_cps/cp_cps.html

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[RFC2527] - S. Chokani and W. Ford, Internet X.509 Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework, RFC 2527, March 1999

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